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0n September 22, 2004, the Program on Alternative Investments,under the leadership of the Center on Japanese Economy and
Business and in cooperation with the Japan Business Association,
presented “Shinsei Bank: How to Win with a New Business Model.” 
Shinsei Bank, Ltd., previously the Long-Term Credit Bank of
Japan (LTCB), was nationalized in October 1998. In March 2000, a
consortium of foreign investors led by the U.S. private equity fund
Ripplewood Holdings, acquired LTCB, and the bank made a fresh
start as a private commercial bank and changed its name to Shinsei Bank. The bank was
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in February 2004. Mr. Yashiro began by detailing the
emergence of Shinsei Bank and the transformation from traditional lending practices toward
new, customer-oriented ventures such as retail and investment banking (with a focus on
business solutions). The bank underwent startling changes in technology and cultural mind-
set, and perhaps, most importantly, in profitability.
Professor Hugh Patrick, director of the Center on Japanese Economy and Business, mod-
erated the discussion following Mr. Yashiro’s presentation. Excerpts of the evening’s lively
discussion are provided in this report.
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Shinsei Bank, once known as Long-
Term Credit Bank, was established in
the 1950s. It was one of the three
long-term credit banks in Japan, and
it provided long-term funds for the
reconstruction of the Japanese econo-
my. After that, it made available
important long-term credit to many
industries in Japan. 
During the bubble period there
w e re two schools of thought. One
was that LTCB should try to trans-
f o rm itself into more or less an
investment type bank. The other
was that it should copy the larg e
Japanese banks by expanding the
balance sheet size. At that time, it
had a balance sheet of about $200
billion. The bank lent a larg e
amount of money mainly to thre e
sectors: retail, nonbanks, and the
construction industry.
After the bubble burst around 1992,
the bank continued to survive for
about six years, and in 1998 it went
bankrupt. It was nationalized tem-
porarily in October 1998, and the
g o v e rnment tried to sell the bank to
anyone who wanted to buy it.
A p p a rently, the government adviser,
Goldman Sachs, talked to more than
70 institutions, including fore i g n
institutions, and all the major
Japanese bank and insurance com-
panies. Nobody showed any intere s t
in buying, except for one of the
l a rge French institutions and another
g roup from Japan, Mitsui Chuo
Trust Bank.
Tim Collins, Chris Flowers (who had
re t i red by then from Goldman
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Sachs—he had been Global Head
for Financial Institutions), and I
w e re involved in the negotiations
with the government, which lasted
for one year. Finally, in March 2000
the bank was sold to an investor
g roup known as LTCB Partners,
which was founded by Ripplewood
and J. C. Flowers. The new bank
was renamed Shinsei Bank in June
2000. One of the advisers suggested
at that time we should name it
Renaissance Bank, but I said no.
Shinsei means new birth, which is
very close to Renaissance, but I
thought the Japanese word would
be better, because we can always
be “newly born”—even after many
years, we are still a new bank.
The bank was taken over on Marc h
2. I vividly recall that in the first
week of April, Sogo’s senior man-
agement people came to see us and
asked us to forgive a large amount
of money. I said, “What do you
mean ‘forgive’?” I had never heard
the word; I was not a banker (I
spent 30 years with Exxon—today’s
Exxon Mobil). Since 1974, I had
been head of Exxon Japan, and
then I went to Houston to run
d o w n s t ream operations for the Asia
Pacific. “Loan forgiveness” was not
in my vocabulary. I asked, “Why?”
They said, “Well, because this is
done in Japan.” I asked them how
much they wanted forgiven. They
said about ¥100 billion, $1 billion
out of the $2 billion loan to them. I
said, “absolutely not.”
The reason we had to reject this
request was that when we looked at
their plan, it would take 15 to 17
years to restructure. If you forgive
half the loan, the remaining portion
still needs special supervision in the
obligor category. It requires that we
put aside an additional ¥30 billion,
about $300 million as a loss reserve
for Sogo. The first year’s predicted
profit, which we submitted to the
government as a plan, was only
¥19.5 billion, but we had to set aside
¥30 billion. We would show a first-
year loss of about ¥10 billion. That
was the problem.
We then tried to reevaluate all of the
assets of the balance sheet. We had
people coming in from outside,
including some from Citibank who
worked with me and had come to us
with the good graces of Citibank. I
had an open agreement with John
Reed at that time that I would not
hire anybody from Citibank without
its approval. One who joined us was
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the manager of credit. He came, and
we started looking at asset quality.
We found that according to the gov-
ernment assessment of the total loan
assets of ¥7.5 trillion, bad assets
accounted for ¥1.9 trillion, or 25 
percent. 
After the government spent ¥3.6 tril-
lion disposing of the assets, they still
had ¥1.9 trillion, but that was not all.
As a result of our reevaluation of
asset quality, we found an additional
¥700 billion in bad assets, bringing
the total to ¥2.6 trillion. In the subse-
quent three years, we found, because
of the economic environment, we
had to classify another ¥300 billion as
bad assets. The bank’s assets were
really bad. We had to restructure.
First, we needed to clean up our bal-
ance sheet, but resolving the bad
loan problem was only one of the
two major tasks we had at hand.
From day one, I felt very strongly
that the business model we inherited
from LTCB was not a good one. It
had no future because it involved
two very simple businesses: selling
debentures (and some of the deben-
tures were sold to people who did
not want to be identified as owning
them); and making loans to corpo-
rate customers, using funds collected
from debenture buyers. That was the
business model. Since the govern-
ment started issuing medium-term
government bonds and commercial
banks were also allowed to sell
straight bonds, the LTCB debentures
were no longer unique. This business
had no future.
Lending money to Japanese corpo-
rate customers makes no profit what-
soever. We needed to change the
business, and we thought that the
emphasis had to be customer orient-
ed and customer centric. We believed
that there were three businesses we
had to develop. The first was tradi-
tional lending, which is still the core
of the bank, but we needed to move
into new areas, one of which was
retail banking. Retail banking was
very important, because we needed
to have a stable funding source.
Retail bank customers never leave
their bank if the bank has good qual-
ity of capital, as well as good service,
which is very important. Also, once
you start making money in the retail
bank, you can continue to improve
the margins steadily.
We also needed to devise corporate-
side business solutions. As long as
customers have problems of a finan-
cial nature and you are able to come
up with solutions for those problems,
you will be successful. We decided to
move into investment banking–type
activities. So we started hiring people
from outside. 
I should also talk a little about infor-
mation technology. I remember vivid-
ly, in May 2000, at one of the man-
agement committee meetings, asking
the controllers if we made money
last month, in April. The controller
said, “we don’t know. We don’t
count more than twice a year. That’s
the practice in the bank.” I almost
fell off my chair, because 40 years
ago, when I was working as one of
the department managers in an
Exxon subsidiary, we started count-
ing everything on a monthly basis,
and we even looked at return on
assets, and re t u rn on capital
employed. Here we were in the year
2000, and the bank didn’t count on a
monthly basis!
We had to revamp the entire tech-
nology of the bank. I went aro u n d
the building and found many PCs
lying idle on the floor, collecting
dust. I asked, “What are these?” The
head guy of IT said, “These are per-
sonal computers.” I asked him,
“ W h e re did you get them? How did
you get them? We re they purc h a s e d ,
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or are they on lease?” He said they
w e re on a five-year lease from one
of the Japanese hardware compa-
nies, and this was the fifth year.
They were so slow that nobody was
using them.
With a new head of IT, we changed
the entire system in one year. He is
Indian and spent 25 years with
Citicorp in operations and technolo-
gy. He and I wanted Shinsei to get
into consumer business and also
investment banking–type activities.
We want to get into all kind of con-
sumer products, not only yen-denom-
inated, but also foreign currency and
investment-type products such as
mutual funds, life insurance products,
and so on. We talked, as well, about
what kind of distribution network we
would establish for our consumer
business. We discussed, among other
things, ATM expansion, connecting
Shinsei Bank ATMs to Postal Service,
and establishing modern, high-speed
ATMs of our own and call centers. 
He started revamping the entire
information system. It was a great
success. We spent about 1/10th of
what otherwise would have been
required if we had followed Japanese
bank practices.
I would like to talk about institution-
al banking in a little more in detail.
We always consider the loan to be
one of many products. If you look at
Japanese banks, 85 percent of the
profit comes from interest rate
spreads; they say 15 percent of fee
income, but fee income includes
ATM charges. That’s not a fee, to my
mind. We should not charge cus-
tomers ATM usage in the first place.
We needed to change the business
model, moving into areas where cor-
porate customers have financial prob-
lems and offering solutions.
Naturally, we went into securitization.
Credit trading was very attractive,
particularly when banks had bad
loan problems and needed to get rid
of distressed assets. If we bought at
the right price, we could make
money. We bought one of the failed
insurance companies, with a face
value of ¥90 billion toward the end
of 2000, at a price that made our bot-
tom line ¥5 billion. That’s one trans-
action. 
Our bankers came up with no-
recourse lending. This was very
familiar from my days with Exxon. I
was running Asia Pacific as the exec-
utive vice president of the region
way back in the early1980s. We bor-
rowed money from major banks
around the world, for instance, with
Citibank as the manager, to build
platforms in Malaysia. When the gov-
ernment ordered us not to continue
production or to change the main
framework of the crude production
operations, we would give the plat-
form to the banks. That’s how we
protected our interests. We did exact-
ly the same thing as a bank to help
customers. When we could not make
a loan because the quality of the cus-
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tomer’s financial situation was poor,
but they happened to have a very
good project with good cash flow,
we made a loan against that cash
flow. If the project failed, we took it
over. That’s the kind of loan asset
business we wanted to get into.
The bank’s personnel manager
showed me a list of senior managers
and their backgrounds. Every one of
them seemed to have had a two-year
rotation assignment. They were gen-
eralists who knew a little bit about
everything, but if you asked detailed
questions, they didn’t know anything
about specifics. That’s the way that
Japanese managers develop. They
make section head or department
head, but they’re not specialists in
any particular area. We stopped that
practice.
We needed to bring in outside peo-
ple with a lot of experience and
skills. When we took over the bank,
it had 2,150 people. Today, we have
2,550 people. We increased employ-
ment by 400 full-time employees. I
would say we lost or let go about
600. Overall, we hired 850 to 900
people. Every year we hire about 50
new graduates, including MBAs from
U.S. universities. The mix of people
is very different today. We don’t care
about what school they went to,
what gender or ethnicity they are.
What they can do is more important.
Today, we have about 100 non-
Japanese in the bank. 
We started retail banking in June
2001, more than one year after we
took over the bank. We began from a
zero base. Today we have 800,000
new accounts, which is very impres-
sive. Every month, we get 25 to
30,000 new accounts. The amount of
money we have collected from
depositors is nearly ¥2 trillion and
growing. 
PowerSmart is a housing loan we
offer that is very different from most
of other housing loans available from
Japanese banks, because you can
pay whenever you happen to have
cash or you can go back to the origi-
nal schedule of the loan. It’s very
flexible.
We don’t have a mainframe comput-
er. We use Microsoft Windows as
work stations. The beauty of this is
that it’s low cost and very flexible.
We can change components as
though they were children’s Legos.
We can start new products within a
couple of months’ time and we don’t
have to pay huge maintenance and
modification fees. We have even cre-
ated an IT center in India that is con-
nected to our IT through the IP tele-
phone videoconference system.
I used to have a video conference
with Citibank in the early 1990s.
Once every month, we had an
Executive VP conference known as
the “G-15.” I had to go to an outside
KD system, which cost us ¥400,000
per hour. Today, we have IP tele-
phone internally and externally. If I
want to call Professor Patrick at
Columbia, it may cost the bank
maybe ¥5 per minute. For a 60-
minute conversation, we’ll pay prob-
ably ¥300, or US$3.00, instead of the
huge amount we used to pay. 
Today, I believe Shinsei Bank has the
best MIS system in Japan, because
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expenses allocate not only direct
expenses, but indirect expenses too,
for each product group and each
customer group, in a matrix.
Horizontally and vertically, every
month we know how much we’re
making and how much we’ve lost in
any area. Also, we know incremen-
tally how we’re doing. That informa-
tion is available to every manager. If
anybody in the retail bank, even a
person in one of the branches, wants
to know, we make the information
available. Everybody shares the infor-
mation. If we’re not giving them
information, how can we ask them to
do better?
Corporate governance is also diff e r-
ent from other Japanese banks. We
started with fifteen directors, four of
whom were inside directors. To d a y ,
we have only two inside dire c t o r s ,
and we also moved to a committee
system in June of this year, after the
general meeting with share h o l d e r s .
Since we are a public company, we
thought we should change to the
committee system. There are thre e
committees: the nomination commit-
tee, the compensation committee,
and the audit committee. I am one
of the members of the nomination
committee, but I am not a member
of the other two committees. The
compensation and the audit commit-
tee are composed entirely of outside
d i rectors. 
We have both foreign and Japanese
outside directors. We have two exec-
utive corporate officers as directors:
Thierry Porté (who used to head
Morgan Stanley in Japan and is now
vice-chairman of our bank directors)
and me. The rest are Japanese direc-
tors and are very prominent people.
Among the directors, there are two
general partners, Tim Collins and
Chris Flowers. The rest represent
some of the investors, like Mellon
Bank and UBS America. We also
have three outside advisers to the
board, John Reed, Paul Volcker, and
Vernon Jordan. Our corporate gover-
nance is excellent. We have five
board meetings a year, generally, but
recently we had two special board
meetings during the month of
August. 
When we have a board meeting, I
go to present the preboard re v i e w .
Generally, by the time I finish, I’ve
l e a rned everything by heart. I’ve
had to do it usually twice in To k y o ,
because the board members can’t
get together at one time, in one
place. Also, most of the fore i g n
d i rectors reside in the United States,
so I present in the United States
once and then again in Euro p e ,
since another director is Euro p e a n ,
Emilio Botin of Banco Santander
Central Hispano.
We have tried to keep the board fully
posted. Not only do we present the
special agenda and the items that
require board approval, but we also
explain how the business is doing by
having key people discuss business
performance. At every board meet-
ing, the CFO provides an overall pic-
ture of financial and other business
results to the board members. I think
they keep me on my toes as well,
which is another good thing.
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What about corporate culture? The
most important change that took
place in the last four years was in the
mindset of people working in the
bank. Some people say, “We work
for stakeholders,” but the term stake-
holders tends to include everybody,
and not everybody has the same
interest. One thing, at least, is clear:
if you are making good money, you
can afford to keep employees happy
by paying competitive salaries and
offering good bonuses commensurate
with their performance. I think mak-
ing a profit is a good thing, but
Japanese banks tend to be concerned
more with size than with profitability.
Even if you don’t have credit losses,
even if there is zero cost for credit,
Japanese banks make only 50 basis
points on total assets, compared with
150 basis points in U.S. or European
banks. Japanese banks’ profitability is
only a third of what it should be. We
should concentrate on improving
performance and profitability; other-
wise Japanese banks will not be able
to compete with the rest of the
world.
We still had ¥1 trillion yen in bad
assets on our balance sheet as of
March 2002, but we did move down
from ¥2.9 trillion in bad assets (at last
month’s end) to ¥ 80 billion. About
98 percent was resolved. Plus, we
have ¥150 billion in reserves, which
is double the amount of bad loans.
We used to have 85 percent of rev-
enue coming from interest rate
spreads. Only 15 percent came
through fees in the first year. In the
last fiscal year, 54 percent came from
commission fees, more so than from
institutional banking, of course. Retail
banking was not making money. The
retail bank turnaround is very
impressive. In 2002, we lost ¥5 bil-
lion. In 2003, we lost ¥0.9 billion.
This year, we made double the annu-
al budget target in four months. For
retail banking, growth in assets under
management is 2.5 trillion. That
includes debentures. 
PowerSmart housing loans are now
growing at a monthly rate of about
¥20 billion. We started in earnest
only a year ago, but we now have
¥140 billion in housing loans, and, I
think, by the end of next March’s fis-
cal year, we will probably reach ¥230
to ¥240 billion.
Total revenue in 2003 was ¥124 bil-
lion, net income 66 billion. In 2002,
we decided to invest excess cash in
U.S. corporate bonds, which included
Enron and a couple of other bad
names. So we lost, but we have
reduced U.S. corporate bond expo-
sure from ¥450 billion to ¥50 billion
or so.
ROA is okay at about 1.0 percent,
but our target should be something
like 1.5 percent in the next couple of
years. ROE is 9.4 percent, but we
have excessive cash and capital.
When I went around for an IPO this
past winter, I was criticized by a
Japanese equity analyst that our rev-
enue, particularly our interest
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income, was declining. That’s the
criticism. I get a completely different
criticism from non-Japanese equity
analysts and fund managers. They
say, “You’re not making use of your
capital efficiently.” I told the foreign
analysts that we are looking for
opportunities to buy assets, to buy
companies. We did buy two in the
last month: one is a large nonbank
finance company, APLUS. The other
is Showa Leasing, for which we are
involved in exclusive negotiation.
The total Tier One capital ratio is 15
percent and Tier two is 21 percent,
which will come down to 15 percent
within the next couple of month, and
that is reasonable. Some people ask,
“What is your target?” We don’t have
any particular target, but I think that
Tier One could be as low as 9 per-
cent and Tier Two maybe 14 percent.
Our goal is to be the bank of choice
for institutional/retail customers.
Sustaining long-term growth in pro f-
its is very important. I do not like to
make money today and lose it next
year; that’s not the business we are
in. We are in business for long-term ,
sustainable growth in profit. That’s
how I was taught in Exxon. I was
not brought up in the banking
industry. I never liked the ups and
downs; I like stable, sustainable,
l o n g - t e rm profit growth. We should
have an insatiable appetite for pro f i t
g rowth. That is going to contribute
to shareholder value, to society. We
have to concentrate on pro f i t a b i l i t y
in order to do everything else we
want to.
D i s c u s s i o n
HUGH PAT R I C K
D i r e c t o r, Center on Japanese Economy
and Business
In the early years, you and Shinsei
Bank were severely criticized and
very unpopular with Japanese
bankers and many regulators and the
media. Why do you think that was
the case, and how did you respond?
Yashiro: The problem in Japan is
the relationship between particular
corporate customers and banks. They
have three different types of relation-
ship, one of which is the lender-bor-
rower relationships. The other is that
most Japanese banks try to own 4.9
percent of many of their customers’
shares. Third, because of that rela-
tionship, they tend to send key peo-
ple to run the company—not only
the CFO but also sometimes the
CEO. These three relationships con-
flict with one another. If you’re a
creditor, your interest is not identical
to that of a shareholder. You want to
charge as much as possible. You
want to collect, while the customer
wants not to repay.
Also, the CEO and the CFO from the
bank generally tend to be senior
people sent from the bank. Middle
management people are trying to rec-
tify problems or restructure cus-
tomers when they go and talk to the
CFO. Maybe they won’t be able to
have an effective conversation. These
three different types of relationship
continue. In fact, we had more than
$1 billion in loans to one of the
retailers, most in short-term loans.
We started a conversation, but they
did not respond to our satisfaction.
They kept talking about one restruc-
turing plan after another, and a
restructuring plan was not satisfactory
from our point of view. Nor did we
have the time or ability to get deeply
involved with their restructuring plan.
We said we’d like to have the short-
term loan repaid on schedule, and
they refused. I asked, “Can I talk to
the president of the main bank?” Two
days later the word came back: “Yes,
you can talk.” 
I went to see four presidents of four
banks. This is illustrative of the bank
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relationship. The CEO of one larg e
bank said, “Ya s h i ro-san, they are
doing their best. We should be sup-
portive.” I told him that the bank
owned that company, in fact,
because there’s no value on its bal-
ance sheet. The net worth is zero or
negative. There f o re, the bank owned
the company, and we should re a l l y
f o rce it to do an accelerated re s t r u c-
turing, even replacing management
and having a debt equity swap. 
The bank should take over. They
said, “That’s too harsh. We cannot
do that.”
The second person seemed to
understand better what I was trying
to say. He said, “If I were you, I
would do it, but we are diff e re n t . ”
Enough was said, so I went to the
third bank. The third bank said,
“ Ya s h i ro-san, you go ahead, we’ll
follow you later.” The fourth person
didn’t have any comment. That’s
how Japanese banks handle things.
It hasn’t changed. The customer is
king. But they interpret customer
and king incorrectly. If the cus-
tomer’s management failed in run-
ning the company properly, in mak-
ing a profit, in re t u rning the loan,
paying interest, and so on and so
forth, why should you bail him out?
The government interf e res, of
course, by saying, “We cannot let
100,000 employees go out on the
s t reet.” Ten years ago, most
Japanese companies never thought
they could let people go, particular-
ly very senior Japanese. There is a
very interesting example of how the
mentality hasn’t changed much.
T h e re are 700 or so subsidiaries of a
very large electric machinery compa-
ny—about four years ago, I was
asked if I knew how many of them
w e re making money. I said maybe
60 percent or so. I was told, “No,
only one third.” Two-thirds have
been losing money for years and
years. I asked, “Why didn’t you get
rid of them?” He said, “They are our
c h i l d ren. We cannot afford to get rid
of the children.” There are safety
nets of this kind, one after another. 
I think we were criticized because
we started behaving diff e rently fro m
what most Japanese expected fro m
another Japanese. Government, on
the other hand, never expected us
to exercise our options. People say
we are making money by exerc i s i n g
our cancellation right. If the quality
of an asset deteriorated past a cer-
tain threshold, we can give the asset
back to the government with the
reserve received from govern m e n t .
We make no money, in fact, but we
do have the losing venture re m o v e d
f rom our balance sheet by giving
the asset back to the government. I
was called to the Diet four times,
and I tried to explain. I did suc-
ceed, because I welcomed those
questions not based on fact, but on
what was said in the weekly maga-
zines. It was a great opportunity for
me to explain the facts in a rational
m a n n e r.
At first, other banks did not like
what we did, but now they’re doing
exactly what we did three years ago,
or going beyond us. We’ve been
very careful, because we were given
a business improvement order by
FSA in September 2001, because we
collected too harshly. If you talk to
the customers once and try to col-
lect, they are mad at you. If you go
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t h e re three times, four times, in the
end they say, “Okay, since you
come so many times asking us to do
this, we’ll do it.” Finesse is very
important. I think, being Japanese, I
understand how the Japanese mind
operates. We have changed our
a p p roach and we’ve been very suc-
cessful since then. If you’re not criti-
cized, you’re liked, but we are not
i n t e rested in running in a popularity
contest and losing money. That’s not
our business.
Q: What do you think is the differ-
ence between successful restructuring
and a failed restructuring? Is it lack of
leadership, or lack of disclosure?
Yashiro: I think there are a couple
of reasons Japanese restructuring has
not succeeded as well as it should.
Part of the reason is that most
Japanese management probably 
hasn’t had the experience needed to
restructure. As you know, the
Japanese economy kept growing for
many, many years until the bubble
burst, so most people who are today
in a management position are in their
late 50s and early 60s. They started
their career at age 23 or 24 in one
company, and of their 35 years in
business, probably 80 or 90 percent
was spent at a time when the econo-
my was growing very fast. You did
not have to worry about profitability.
Returns could stay low. They never
had to learn how to restructure. I
went through many years with Exxon
in which we had many ups and
downs. We lost oil fields; in 1973, we
lost upstream revenue completely
from Venezuela and the Middle East.
We had to restructure our business.
Exxon is among the top performers
despite these ups and downs,
because it is very careful with what it
does with its money.
Restructuring is not unique to the
United States. You have to have thor-
oughly thought-out plans to deal
with your problems. It seems to me
that the Japanese have one bad
habit. If the leader in an industry
starts doing something, everybody
copies it. Because of our great suc-
cess in the ’60s, ’70s, and ’80s, we
stopped thinking through the issues
and have become intellectually lazy.
People started to move before think-
ing things through. You cannot afford
to do this now. If you come up with
a well-thought-out plan, implementa-
tion is simple. If you start running
with the pack thoughtlessly, the cost
is heavy. 
I’m going to retire soon, and at the
IPO many people asked exactly
when that would be. I said that one
year after IPO is the generally accept-
ed amount of time CEOs should stay.
I started thinking about what I
should be doing for the bank. In
January, I began talking about this.
We need to have a strategy, a plan,
and a budget all in one package, by
business. Corporate planning staff
can serve as a sort of secretariat, but
strategies, plans, and budgets have to
be developed for each business. We
started working on that. I think I
have never taken so much time to
get something done. We only fin-
ished this past week. It took almost
eight months.
Most people in Japan, particularly
chief executives, start by saying, “We
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issues and have become
intellectually lazy. 
—Masamoto Ya s h i ro
will be doubling our income over the
next five years,” or “By the third
year, we’ll make so much money,”
and I think how to get there is not
an important part of their thinking.
To my mind, the financial result is an
outcome, a lagging indicator. We
don’t have to worry about the finan-
cial result, if strategies are properly
executed.
It is important to develop a specific
action plan and then a monitoring
system, where we measure the key
performance indicators, which
include not only quantitative per-
formance indicators but also qualita-
tive performance indicators. We
check that every quarter by business,
by customer group, by product. I feel
very good about it, because there are
no surprises. We monitor and then
make the necessary adjustments as
we go. This is the discipline we
need, and I am very, very pleased
that this is done. 
Q: Can you describe how your rela-
tions with the regulatory authorities
evolved as you set out to run a bank
in a different way from what had
been done in Japan before? 
Yashiro: The Wall Street Journal
recorded my conversation with the
top regulator, based on information I
am afraid was leaked by our staff to
the Journal. Because of this leak,
that regulator became very difficult to
talk to, but then he was gone. The
new management became much
more willing to work with us. In fact,
I have a policy: even if regulators do
not like us, we’ll keep them
informed.
The head of the supervisory bure a u
and the bank head generally don’t
meet unless there are reasons to 
do so. I am doing my best to keep
regulators very well informed of
what we’re doing. If they have
views, we will listen, but if we don’t
a g ree and if we feel that it is impor-
tant for us to stick to our own posi-
tion, so long as it’s not against the
regulations or law, we will not
capitulate to pre s s u re. We speak our
mind, we state our position. We
substantiate what we say with facts,
and so on.
In the last two and a half to three
years, our relationship with the regu-
lators has been very, very good. We
don’t try to build an intimate relation-
ship. I’ve never had meals with any
regulator.
Q: I have an impression that Shinsei
Bank is very much focused on
domestic banking. Can you give us a
comparison of domestic with global
in terms of profit and revenue?
Ya s h i ro : Our non-Japanese re v e n u e
is not very large. We have a pre s-
ence in Taiwan, in Korea, in Ger-
many, and in the UK. In all those
places we don’t have branches, but
we have a re p resentative office. We
also have a re p resentative office in
New Yo r k .
With regard to revenue, our target is
no more than 10 percent of re v e n u e
f rom non-Japan sources. I don’t
think we have achieved that yet, but
it will probably grow. In Taiwan and
K o rea, we bought distressed assets,
two large ones in Taiwan and two
medium-sized ones in Korea. We
continue to look for opportunities to
buy assets in those countries. In
G e rmany, we’re trying to buy assets
f rom German banks. In the UK, we
bought Japan-based re i n s u r a n c e
companies. We can’t be global.
When a domestic opportunity arises,
we grab it. In asset acquisition activ-
ities, we are in competition with
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and
M o rgan Stanley, not with Japanese
companies. 
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Q: According to your profile, you
studied law and international rela-
tions; you didn’t study business. Why
did you succeed as a business person
even so? 
Yashiro: I went to an excellent busi-
ness school—Exxon. Many people
have asked me to compare Exxon
and Citicorp. At Exxon, everything is
so disciplined. Back in 1962, I
became head of the planning depart-
ment of Esso in Japan. I was doing
mostly return on capital employed
(today’s MIS does that). For refinery
projects, I would figure out our cash
flow return, etc. Later on, I did value-
added analysis. 
In the early ’70s, I was number two
in Standard Oil’s (New Jersey) corpo-
rate planning department. The head
of corporate planning complained to
me. He said Japan operations just
keep investing in facilities, equip-
ment, and refineries and are not
returning any cash to the parents. I
thought, “That’s strange—why does
he complain when the companies are
making money?” He was thinking
that, on a cash flow basis, money is
not coming back to shareholders,
because the nonconsolidated joint
venture refining company is paying,
say, a 25 percent dividend, but it was
25 percent on the stock par value of
¥50, or ¥12.5. With a share market
price of ¥1,000, that was only a 1.25
percent return. That’s not good
enough. Even in the early 1970s, we
always talked about how to improve
profitability, cash flow, and avoiding
bank borrowing. All these things
were done almost 40 years ago.
Exxon was a very good school.
Q: What is your feeling about the
closing of Citibank’s private banking
unit in Japan?
Yashiro: I would refrain from mak-
ing any comments because I spent
seven years with Citicorp. During my
time the same problem happened. I
took disciplinary action. I informed
regulators the next day after I discov-
ered the problem, and I thought the
problem was over. I will make one
general comment: You have to be
completely compliant with the laws
and regulations. You do not second
guess how their regulators would
interpret them. You take a very strict
line of interpretation. If you think
you may be treading in dangerous
waters, you give up your profit
opportunities. 
That I learned in Exxon. Ken Jensen
was the chairman of Exxon in 1973,
after the energy crisis. I was his exec-
utive assistant. He sent a letter to
every employee around the world,
150,000 of them, saying that if mak-
ing a profit in a particular way is
going to violate laws and regulations,
including conflict of interest or anti-
monopoly laws, give up that oppor-
tunity. If anybody is trying to bypass
laws and regulations, report them. If
your boss doesn’t listen, come to
management. I think that’s the way
to run a business.
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Q: How do you see, in five years’
time, the Japanese bank industry?
How do you see the position of
Shinsei? What are the strongest and
weakest points of Shinsei? 
Yashiro: We have already reached
the point where we now have a
completely clean balance sheet. We
should take on more risk in the com-
ing months, but not stupidly. Return
expectations should be relative to the
risk we take.
It’s very strange to me that even
bankers don’t understand that the
interest you must charge to the cus-
tomer is composed of three elements:
funding cost, risk premium, and cost
of capital. It’s simple. Everybody
knows that, but they don’t charge
accordingly. There are loan bank
finance companies charging up to 29
percent. It’s a no-man’s-land from 5
to 15 percent. I don’t understand
that. If the banks start charging a
profitable interest rate, the bank can
make money, but lending money
should not be the sole source of
income, accounting for 80 percent of
revenue, because the bank will lose
its competitive power to capture the
market. Corporate customers whose
quality is better than the banks can
raise funds more cheaply from the
market.
Banks have to change this model.
Shinsei Bank will continue to offer
solutions to customers. If the cus-
tomer has certain needs, you satisfy
those needs and do not charge
where you can save expense, such as
ATM charges. Since we have devel-
oped a low-cost interest structure, we
don’t have to charge for this. It costs
us money, but we still don’t charge.
If you go to the bank and use the
ATM, because the bank is closed, it
still charges you for drawing your
money over a weekend or at night. If
you leave ¥100 million in a savings
account in Japan, how much interest
does the bank pay on that savings
account? That’s ¥1,000, with a gov-
ernment charge of ¥200, plus a tax of
¥300. If you get in a taxi, the price
for the shortest distance is ¥660.
Basically, you can’t get back home
with the interest you receive from
your ¥100 million deposit!
Patrick: You retired from Exxon.
You were very comfortable, and then
you went to Citibank and had fun.
You retired again, and my impression
was you retired even more comfort-
ably. As I understand it, your salary
now is about the same as Japanese
presidents of Japanese banks. Why
did you accept this onerous, chal-
lenging, exciting position? 
Yashiro: Maybe it was stupid. I
never really decide myself what I do.
I never chose occupations or profes-
sion myself. I thought I would try to
be a teacher, after Tokyo University
Graduate School. In the second year
I was trying to get a Ph.D., I was
asked by today’s Exxon to come to
work. I thought I wanted to be a
teacher, so I said, “No, I don’t think
so.” Then, my wife said, “The gentle-
man who contacted you is still wait-
ing. He keeps calling you. You
should go back and talk.”
When I retired from Exxon, during
the ’80s, Cliff Garvin was the chair-
man, and he said, “You’ll be invited
by many Japanese companies to join
their board.” I said, “No.” He asked
why. I said, “I am a threat to them
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because I think differently. I don’t
like the way the companies are run,
so nobody would invite me.” That
was true. Nobody invited me, but
Harvard Business School and
Citibank did. Again, I said, “What do
I do?” My wife asked, “Are you going
to teach at Harvard in Boston?” I
said, “Yes, and I don’t like to go
back to the States after seven years in
Houston. That’s enough.” She asked,
“Where do you work, if you work 
for Citibank?” In Tokyo. She said,
“That’s it. That’s what you should
do.” So, I did. 
For this challenge, the ¥44 million is
the annual salary compensation—
that’s the total. Why did I take it? The
money was not the object. I did not
know the arrangement. When I went
to work for Citibank, I was asked if I
wanted to have a management con-
tract. I said, “I don’t care. If I like the
work, I will work. If I don’t, I’ll quit.”
They asked about the compensation I
was getting from Exxon, so I gave
the details. Citibank gave me the
same arrangement.
Patrick: I think you wanted to be a
teacher.
Yashiro: Yes.
P a t r i c k : And you wanted to teach
the Japanese how a bank should be
run. I think you were a patriot,
because as a Japanese, you saw
how badly things were going in
Japan and you felt that you could
contribute by doing something. I’ve
always appreciated and re s p e c t e d
that aspect of you. You pro b a b l y
would never admit it, which is why
I have to say it, but I think that’s
i m p o r t a n t .
Thank you very much for taking the
time to be with us today.
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